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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1876, President Rutherford B. Hayes said about the telephone, "[t]hat's
an amazing invention-but who would ever want to use one of them?" One
hundred and thirty years later, President Hayes would be surprised to realize
that the telephone has been the starting point of so many technological
innovations in telecommunications. These innovations question the notion of
borders, and a mouse click in Japan leads to numerous legal issues
throughout the globe. While the libertarian view that the Internet would be an
environment free of any regulation is not seriously contended anymore,'
questions remain as to the extent to which existing regulations should apply
and how.
In spite of the "dot-com" crisis faced by several companies in the last few
years, the development of e-commerce continues.2 In 2004, the UK Office
for National Statistics (ONS) reported that Internet sales in the UK had risen
by 81% in one year to £71.1 billion, and that the proportion of businesses
selling having sold online had grown by 24%3 According to Verisign, e-
commerce dollar volume rose in 2004 by 88% during the Christmas holidays
in comparison with 2003, which had an annual growth of 39%.4 While this
data can always be disputed, it reveals an undeniable trend towards a
growing significance of e-commerce year after year.
The growth of e-commerce is bound to be linked with online disputes.
Unlike offline disputes, these disputes present several features. In the real
world, business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions tend to bind parties that are
submitted to the same legal system. The situation may be different in e-
* Assistant Professor (Lausanne, Switzerland); J.S.M. (Stanford); Attorney at Law.
See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? (2006).
2 E-commerce is defined as "the practice of buying and selling goods and services
through online consumer services on the Internet." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 530 (7th
ed. 1999).
3 OFFICE OF NATIONAL STATISTICS, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGY (ICT) ACTIVrrY OF UK BUSINESSES, 2004,
available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/themeeconomy/ecommerce_
report_2004.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
4 Verisign, Internet Commerce Grows 88 Percent by Dollar Volume and 39 Percent
by Transaction Volume: Fraud Remains a Concern,
http://www.verisign.com/press-releases/pr/page_028572.html (last visited Sept. 15,
2007).
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commerce, where parties will regularly be subject to different jurisdictions.
While this diversity has been a daily reality in the business-to-business (B2B)
environment for several decades, it had never been faced in a B2C and a
fortiori in a consumer-to-consumer (C2C) environment. Considering the fact
that the average transaction on the Internet amounts to $146.00, 5 one does
not need to be an economist to realize that a French citizen will never spend
several thousands of dollars to bring an action in a U.S. court for a breach of
contract. As Crawford states, "[t]raditional courts are ill suited for settling
small claims due to cost barriers." 6 In other words, online transactions may
often imply a renunciation to any possible legal remedy. Having this concern
in mind, the stakeholders quickly realized that they had to find a way to deal
with online disputes out of the court system to enhance the consumers'
confidence and allow the development of e-commerce.
Since 1996,7 this "out of the court system" solution has a name: Online
Dispute Resolution (ODR). ODR can be defined as any "form of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) that incorporate[s] the use of the Internet" 8 or
technological tools.9 While ODR is primarily designed to solve online
disputes, the management of offline disputes could benefit from this
development as well.' 0 In their survey conducted in 2003, Melissa Conley
5 Id.
6 Victoria C. Crawford, A Proposal to Use Alternative Dispute Resolution as a
Foundation to Build an Independent Global Cyberlaw Jurisdiction Using Business to
Consumer Transactions as a Model, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 383, 389
(2002); Mohamed Wahab, Globalisation and ODR: Dynamics of Change in E-Commerce
Dispute Settlement, 12 INT'L J. LAW & INFO. TECH. 123, 129 (2004); see also LUCILLE M.
PONTE & THOMAS D. CAVENAGH, CYBERJUSTICE: ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ODR)
FOR E-COMMERCE 12 (Elizabeth Sugg ed., Prentice Hall 2005).
7 This is the time when the first legal scholars started to write about ODR and when
the first attempts to put in place ODR systems can be observed. See Ethan Katsh, Dispute
Resolution in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 953 (1996).
8 ABA, Addressing Disputes in Electronic Commerce: Final Recommendations and
Report, 58 BUs. LAW. 415, 419 (2002).
9 See GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER & THOMAS SCHULTz, ONLINE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: CHALLENGES FOR CONTEMPORARY JUSTICE 7 (Julian Lew ed., Kluwer Law
Int'l 2004).
10 Beatrice Baumann, Electronic Dispute Resolution (EDR) and the Development of
Internet Activities, 52 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1227, 1239 (2002); see Frank A. Cona,
Application of Online Systems in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 975,
990 (1997). H6mle mentions in particular the use of electronic file management and the
exchange of documents on CD-ROM. Julia H6mle, Online Dispute Resolution: The
Emperor's New Clothes?, 17 INT'L. REv. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 27, 33 (2003). Clark
refers to the use of video links and video testimony by witnesses in Australian Courts in
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Tyler and Di Bretherton listed seventy-six websites aimed in some way at
solving disputes. I I Just two years later, there would be more than 100.12
Governmental agencies and public organizations have also entered the
game and provided several reports and recommendations as to the
development of ODR in the last few years. 13 The number of ODR providers
and the interest raised by this development has been tremendous in legal
scholarship, and probably disproportionate as compared with its current
practical significance. Strangely enough, and as will be shown, legal scholars
have either undermined or totally ignored one aspect that seems particularly
relevant to analyze the potential development of ODR: the psychological
perception of computer-mediated disputes as compared with face-to-face
negotiation or mediation.
This paper shall be divided in two parts. In Part II, I shall conduct a
review of legal scholars who have dealt with ODR. This part will start by
providing the reader with a general overview of the current state of ODR in
Subsection A, before summing up the advantages which have been pointed
out by legal scholars in Subsection B and the concerns they have raised in
Subsection C. Part III, the core of this paper, will reflect the experiments that
have been conducted as to the differences of perceptions between face-to-
face and computer-mediated disputes and their outcomes. In Part IV, the
particular. Eugene Clark et al., Online Dispute Resolution: Present Realities, Pressing
Problems, and Future Prospects, 17 INT'L. REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 7, 14 (2003).
11 MELISSA CONLEY TYLER & Di BRETHERTON, SEVENTY-SIX AND COUNTING: AN
ANALYSIS OF ODR SITES 1 (2003), available at
http://www.odr.info/unece2003/pdf/Tyler.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
12 Thomas Schultz, Seminar Given for the Swiss Arbitration Association (ASA),
Online Dispute Resolution: tour d'horizon de la pratique, slide 6, http://www.online-
adr.org/Talk-ASA-slides.pdf. (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
13 See ABA, Addressing Disputes in Electronic Commerce: Final Recommendations
and Report, 58 Bus. LAW. 415, 419-21 (2002); EUROPEAN UNION-DELEGATION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO THE UNITED STATES, STATEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND THE UNITED STATES ON BUILDING CONSUMER CONFIDENCE IN E-COMMERCE AND THE
ROLE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2000), available at
http://www.eurunion.org/partner/summit/Summit0012/Ecommerce.htm (last visited Sept.
15, 2007); ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD
GUIDELINES FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF COMMERCE (1999),
available at http://www.oecd.org/document/51/0,2340,en_2649_34267
1824435 _ 1_1_1,00.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2007) (hereinafter "OECD"). For a
general discussion of these initiatives, refer to Wahab, supra note 6, at 132-42. On the
ABA report in particular, see Benjamin G. Davis, Building The Seamless Dispute
Resolution Web: A Status Report on The American Bar Association Task Force on E-
Commerce and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 529, 533-34
(2002).
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conclusion, I shall sum up the results of my revie and make suggestions as to
fields of investigations that need to be addressed in the future.
II. ODR IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: WHERE ARE WE GOING?
A. Current State of ODR
ADR traditionally refers to three types of institutions: negotiation,
mediation, and arbitration. Thanks to its specificities, the online environment
allows the creation of new ADR models that did not exist and which use the
technological architecture that is currently in place. This includes automated
negotiation or credit card chargeback systems described below. This lead
Ethan Katsh and Janet Rifin to speak of information technology as a "fourth
party" in addition to the parties and the neutral.14
Authors traditionally deal with and make a distinction between several
kinds of ODR:
1. Assisted Negotiation
Unlike mediation or arbitration, negotiation does not imply the
intervention of a third party. Assisted negotiation enables the parties to refer
to a technological tool offered by the provider to try and settle their case on
their own. 15 In other words, the main service of assisted negotiation systems
is to provide software for setting up the communication, assistance in
developing agendas, engaging in productive discussions, identifying and
assessing potential solutions, as well as writing agreements. While e-mail
might be seen as a form of primitive assisted negotiation, this type of
negotiation more commonly implies the use of complex software.' 6 Several
ODR providers offer assisted negotiation tools as a first phase where the
14 ETHAN KATSH & JANET RIFKIN, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 93-116 (Jossey-
Bass 2001).
15 COLIN RULE, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR BUSINESS 55-56 (Jossey-Bass
2002).
16 KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 11-16; see also NORMON
SOLOvAY & CYNTHIA K. REED, THE INTERNET AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: UNTANGLING
THE WEB 2-46 (Law Journal Press 2006).
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parties try to solve their dispute on their own. 17 Using these tools, the rate of
settlement would be around 60%-80%. 18
2. Automated Negotiation
This type of ODR, which fully uses the potential provided by
technology, does not have any equivalent in the offline world. In automated
negotiation, the dispute is solved through software, which plays the role of a
negotiator.1 9 In other words, technology supersedes human intervention.
Often called "blind-bidding negotiation," the system operates as follows: a
claimant presents its request to the chosen institution, which then contacts the
other party.20 The respondent is either bound to the procedure through a
contractual provision, or can decline the offer of negotiation. 21 When the
respondent accepts to negotiate, the parties enter a "blind bidding" procedure,
in which each of them, in turn, offers or demands a certain amount of money.
However, the bids offered by each party are never communicated to the other
one. When the amounts offered are sufficiently close according to an
algorithm contained in the software, i.e., within a range of 5%-30%
depending upon the provider, the case is settled and the difference split
between the parties. 22 The parties usually have three rounds of bidding that
have to take place within a certain time.23 For obvious reasons, this method is
primarily designed to solve financial disputes and encounters real success in
the context of insurance claims. 24 While Cybersettle is the most famous of
these providers, 25 with about 3,000 disputes solved per month, Kaufmann-
17 ECODIR, http://www.ecodir.org (last visited Sept. 5, 2007); SquareTrade,
http://www.squaretrade.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
18 KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 16.
19 SOLOVAY & REED, supra note 16, at 2-48.
20 RULE, supra note 15, at 57-58.
21 ECODIR Resolution Rules, Art. 3, http://www.ecodir.org/odrp/rules.htm (last
visited Sept. 14, 2007).
22 For more about the process, see RULE, supra note 15, at 57-58. The example
provided by Cybersettle can be found online. Web Assisted Claim Resolution Services,
http://www.cybersettle.com/info/products/claimresolution.aspx (last visited Sept. 14,
2007); see also SOLOVAY & REED, supra note 16, at 2-48.
23 KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 18-19.
24 See generally RULE, supra note 15, at 135-36, 142-44 (regarding the
development of ODR in the insurance industry, and the success of Cybersettle); KATSH &
RIFKIN, supra note 14, at 62.
25 Cybersettle, http://www.cybersettle.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2007); Aashit Shah,
Using ADR to Resolve Online Disputes, 10 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 25, 27 (2004); Scott
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Kohler and Schultz mention around twenty other providers offering the
service.26 According to a survey conducted at the University of Geneva, this
type of ODR would be more popular than assisted negotiation, presumably
because it takes advantage of all the technological possibilities, 27 and in spite
of the fact that such systems are limited because they do not allow any legal
consideration regarding the merits of a claim. 28
3. Online Mediation
As previously mentioned, mediation will regularly follow an
unsuccessful phase of negotiation between the parties. Unlike negotiation,
mediation implies the intervention of a third party. 29 As compared with an
arbitrator, a mediator does not have any decisionmaking power and can only
help the parties come to an agreement. 30 The Online Ombuds Office (000),
an academic ODR pilot project developed at the University of Massachusetts
by Ethan Katsh and Janet Rifkin, was one of the first ODR website to be put
in place. 31 After having mediated disputes between sellers and buyers on
Donahey, Current Development in Online Dispute Resolution, 16 J. INT'L ARB. 115, 116-
17 (1999); Rachel I. Turner, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: There is
More on the Line, Than Just Getting "Online," 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 133, 141-42
(2000); see William Krause, Do You Want to Step Outside? An Overview of Online
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 457, 460-61
(2001).
26 KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 21 (mentioning, for instance,
BBBOnline, DisputeManager, Intersettle, MARS, SmartSettle, The Claim Room, Web
Assured, WebMediate, and WeCanSettle).
27 Thomas Schultz et al., Online Dispute Resolution: The State of Art and the Issues
5-6 (Dec. 2001) (on file with The Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution).
28 Krause, supra note 25, at 460; SOLOVAY & REED, supra note 16, at 2-48; see also
KATSH & RIFKIN, supra note 14, at 62.
29 RULE, supra note 15, at 39-41.
30 RULE, supra note 15, at 40.
31 SOLOVAY & REED, supra note 16, at 2-20. While the website can still be
accessed, the Online Ombuds Office does not seem to have had any activity since 2003,
and now directly refers to the Center for Information Technology and Dispute Resolution
of the University of Massachusetts, http://www.ombuds.org/center/ombuds.html (last
visited Sept. 15, 2007). For more on the 000, see Cona, supra note 10, at 988-90; Lan
Q. Hang, Online Dispute Resolution Systems: The Future of Cyberspace Law, 41 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 837, 846-48 (2001); Katsh, supra note 7, at 966-80; Ethan Katsh et al.,
E-Commerce, E-Disputes, and E-Dispute Resolution: In the Shadow of "eBay Law," 15
OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 705, 706 n.6, 709 n.10 (2000); George H. Friedman,
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Emerging Online Technologies: Challenges and
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eBay, 000 was finally taken over by SquareTrade,32 which can probably be
referred to as the most efficient provider in this category with over 1,500,000
disputes solved between February 2000 and June 2004.3 3 SquareTrade's
success story, however, seems to be an exception. While Kaufmann-Kohler
and Schultz have counted over twenty-five ODR providers offering online
mediation, none seem to be very active but SquareTrade. 34 The system can
be described as follows: once the buyer or seller files a complaint with the
site, SquareTrade notifies the other party of the complaint. The contractor
can respond. Parties then try and settle their case on their own for free
through assisted negotiation, and if this phase does not lead to a settlement,
they can then request the intervention of a neutral to solve their dispute
through mediation for a moderate fee. 35
4. Online Arbitration
Online arbitration allows an arbitrator designated by the parties or by an
institution, such as the ICC or AAA, to render a decision with binding
force. 36 The first ODR provider to be created was the The Virtual
Opportunities, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 695, 706 (1997); KATSH & RIFKIN, supra
note 14, at 56; SOLOVAY & REED, supra note 16, at 2-20.
32 KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 21; PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra
note 6, at 64-65; RULE, supra note 15, at 103; see also KATSH & RIFKIN, supra note 14,
at 66.
33 KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 16; see also SquareTrade,
http://www.squaretrade.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2007). For an explanation related to
the operation of the system itself, see Steve Abemethy, Building Large-Scale Online
Dispute Resolution & Trustmark Systems (2003), http://www.odr.info/unece2003 (last
visited Sept. 15, 2007). Considering its success, a lot of scholars have written about
SquareTrade and describe its mode of operation. Shah, supra note 25, at 27; Krause,
supra note 25, at 462-63.
34 KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 26 n.76 (mentioning ADR
Group/TheClaim Room; ARyME; BRC; The Camera Arbitrale di Milano; Cibertribunal
Peruano; NAM/ClickNsettle; DisputeManager; Consensus Mediation; eNeutral; Internet
Neutral; JAMS; MARS; Mediation First; National Arbitration Forum; NovaForum;
Online Resolution; PrivateJudge.com; Resolution Forum; Retail Tenancy Unit NSW
Online Mediation; SettleTheCase.com; SquareTrade; and WebMediate).
35 For more about the process, see SquareTrade, Step-by-Step Procedure for Filing a
Case, http://www.squaretradedisputeresolution.com/step-by-step.html (last visited Sept.
14, 2007).
36 RULE, supra note 15, at 42. For a definition of the notion of arbitration, see
generally CHARLES JARROssON, LA NOTION D'ARBITRAGE (Paris 1987) (Fr.).
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Magistrate. 37 While the procedure was indeed adjudicatory, it could not be
considered as an arbitration stricto sensu since the parties were not bound by
an arbitration agreement before the dispute arose, but only after the
agreement of the parties to proceed "in front of' the Virtual Magistrate.
Designated in 1996 to solve online disputes encountered by persons harmed
by wrongful postings on the Internet, the Virtual Magistrate never met the
expectations of its founders. While the website still exists, the ODR provider
has only had to deal with one case, Tierney v. Email America,38 that was
rendered by default since the defendant did not proceed. 39 According to the
scholars, the failure of the Virtual Magistrate was the result of several
factors: a limited scope of disputes, a lack of advertising, and the fact that the
project was voluntary so that the case managers had no way to force the
defendant to take part in the proceedings or to enforce the decisions.40 While
the second and third factors certainly played a significant role in the failure
of the Virtual Magistrate, the limited scope of disputes is not at stake, as
proved by the success of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (UDRP), in spite of its limitation to domain names disputes.
According to Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz, there are more than twenty-five
providers offering online arbitration services. 41 However, after having
reviewed most of these websites, it appears that some do not work properly,
others only offer assisted arbitration, i.e. allow the online filing of a claim
such as AAA, and others are not really arbitration, such as the UDRP or the
Virtual Magistrate. In other words, arbitration stricto sensu is still not very
37 Virtual Magistrate, http://www.vmag.org (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
38 Virtual Magistrate Sample Opinion, http://www.vmag.org/sample.html (last
visited Sept. 15, 2007).
39 As the first provider, the Virtual Magistrate obviously drew the attention of
several scholars. Joseph Matthews & Karen Stewart, Online Arbitration of Cross-Border,
Business to Consumer Disputes, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1111, 1123-24 (2002); Crawford,
supra note 6, at 391-92; Shah, supra note 25, at 26; Cona, supra note 10, at 987-88,
995-97 (also includes analysis of the Tierney dispute); Hang, supra note 31, at 845-46,
861-62 (also including reasons for its failure); Friedman, supra note 31, at 700-06;
KATSH & RIFKIN, supra note 14, at 56; PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 6, at 88-90;
SOLOVAY & REED, supra note 16, at 2-6.
40 See Lucille M. Ponte, Boosting Consumer Confidence in E-Business.
Recommendations for Establishing Fair and Effective Dispute Resolution Programs for
B2C Online Transactions, 12 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 441, 458-61 (2002).
41 KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 34 (mentioning the AAA; the
ADR Group; ARyME; BBBOnline; the BRC; the CIArb; the Cibertribunal Peruano;
Consensus Mediation; Dispute Manager; eNeutral; JAMS; MARS; NovaForum; the
Online Public Disputes Project; Online Resolution; the PrivateJudge.com; Resolution
Canada; the Resolution Forum; and SettleTheCase).
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frequently used to solve disputes in cyberspace. This assumption is
confirmed by Schultz, according to whom 5%-10% cases would be settled
through automated negotiation, 60%-70% through assisted negotiation,
20%-30% through mediation, and only 1% through arbitration stricto
sensu.
42
5. The UDRP
The UDRP deserves a place on its own. Enacted in December 1999,
under the auspices of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN), and currently managed by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), the UDRP and SquareTrade are the most
successful ODR provider so far.4 3 The UDRP quickly became the ordinary
way to solve domain name disputes registered under the generic top-level
domains (gTLDs., i.e. ".com," ".org," and ".net"). Considering its
phenomenal success, several countries later decided to adopt it for disputes
encountered within their own country code top level domain (ccTLD, i.e.
".us," ".fr," and ".uk"). 44 To succeed in a case, a complainant must
demonstrate that the domain name in dispute is identical or similar to a
trademark in which rights are held, that the defendant does not have any
legitimate interest in the domain name, and that the defendant registered and
uses it in bad faith.45 New gTLDs were introduced first in 2000 and 2005,
each submitted to additional ODR during a pre-registration phase.46 The
42 Schultz et al.,supra note 27, at 26-27; Schultz, supra note 12, at 12.
43 See generally WIPO, Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/cctld/index.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2007). The
success met by the UDRP has resulted in the publication of numerous publications, and
even books. See, e.g., PHILIPPE GILLItRON, LA PROCEDURE DE RESOLUTION EN LIGNE DES
CONFLITS RELATIFS AUX NOMS DE DOMAINES (CEDIDAC 2002); Laurence R. Heifer &
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 141 (2001).
44 In September 2007, forty-seven States submitted their domain name disputes to
the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center. WIPO, supra note 43. If most of these
countries adopted the UDRP, others, while submitting the management of their disputes
to WIPO, enacted their own procedure, including Switzerland. The Swiss Education and
Research Network, Rules of Procedure for Dispute Resolution Proceedings,
http://www.switch.ch/en/id/disputes/rules-vl.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
45 ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, § 4(a),
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
46 New gLTDs included ".aero," ".biz," ".coop," ".info," ".museum," ".name," and
".pro" in 2000. For an overview of the specific ADR related to these gTLDs, see
GILLIERON, supra note 43, at 183-94. In spite of the relative success of these new gTLDs,
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UDRP, however, remains the main provider of these ODR systems. Its
success is not decreasing, with more than a thousand decisions rendered
every year since 2002, and a total of more than seven thousand decisions
delivered since its enactment. Unlike other ODR providers, the UDRP
presents the particularity to deal with IP infringements. Despite this
particular feature, the UDRP has a contractual nature. The ICANN rules the
domain name system (DNS). 47 In order to be allowed to register domain
names, registrars have to be accredited by the ICANN; to be accredited,
registrars have no choice but to accept to be submitted to the UDRP, and thus
to impose it on their registrants. 48 In other words, the only entity not to be
submitted to the UDRP from the beginning is the rightholder. This is one of
the main differences with arbitration stricto sensu. Parties do not sign any
arbitration agreement but submit to the procedure separately and
independently: the complainant by filing his complaint, and the respondent
by registering his domain name. 49
With the notable exception of the UDRP, disputes submitted to ODR
providers can generally be of any type and filed by anyone. 50 In other words,
the scope of disputes is extremely wide, even though most of them deal with
B2C or C2C cases. While these ODR methods are considered to be the
traditional ones, it is worth mentioning some other kinds that have drawn the
attention of some authors.
6. Other Types of ODR Providers
Credit card chargeback systems appear to have become a significant
mode of dispute resolution in recent years. As defined by Mary Shannon
Martin:
ICANN adopted new sponsored gTLDs in 2005, inlcuding ".cats," ".travels," " .jobs,"
and ".mobi." See ICANN, Status Report on the sTLD Evaluation Process,
http://www.icann.org/tlds/stld-apps-19marO4/stld-status-report.pdf (last visited Sept. 5,
2007).
47 ICANN, http://www.icann.org (last visited Sept. 14, 2007).
48 ICANN, Registrar Accreditation Agreement, Art. 3.8,
http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-17may01.htm#3 (last visited Sept. 14,
2007).
49 Frederic Glaize, UDRP: une d~cision rendue par le Centre d'arbitrage et de
m~diation de I'OMPI est-elle une sentence arbitrabl?, RLDI 2005/1 n' 3, at 13 (Fr.)
(discussing the decision rendered on June 17, 2004 by the First Chamber of the Court of
Appeals in ML.P. v. Stg Miss France, in which the Court denied the arbitral nature of the
procedure).
50 TYLER & BRETHERTON, supra note 11, at 8; Schultz et al., supra note 27, at 20.
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A chargeback occurs when a consumer files a complaint with their credit
card company disputing a particular charge and seeking to halt payment of a
particular item on the consumer's credit card bill. The amount in question is
then "charged back" or credited to the consumer's account until the credit
card company's investigation is complete. 5 1
One of the weak points of this system remains the fact that the
chargeback system is not always extended internationally, 52 thus limiting its
scope of application in e-commerce. However, most major credit card
networks now seem to allow such a protection outside of the United States,
even though they are not legally required to offer such a service. 53 As
Crawford puts it, "the chargeback mechanism puts the private sector
intermediary in the position of resolving the dispute." 54 In other words, the
credit card issuer actually plays the role of a third party.55 This particular
form of ADR is described as a win-win-win situation by Crawford: the
vendor because he utilizes "the protection of a credit card service to ensure
the customer pays for what the customer agreed to pay;" the consumer
because, as a cardholder, liability is limited; and the credit card company
because more business is generated when the parties have confidence in its
service.56
Other types of providers, which are not, strictly speaking, ODR
providers, include online legal advice, also known as complaints assistance, 57
51 Mary Shannon Martin, Note, Keep it Online: The Hague Convention and the
Need for Online Alternative Dispute Resolution in International Business-to-Consumer
E-Commerce, 20 B.U. INT'L L.J. 125, 153 (2002); Krause, supra note 25, at 472-73; Kah
Wei Chong, Online Dispute Resolution in Cross-Jurisdictional Consumer Electronic
Commerce Transactions, at 16 (2001) (unpublished thesis, Harvard University) (on file
with the Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution); RULE, supra note 15, at 110-11;
SOLOVAY & REED, supra note 16, at 7-62; see also Anita Ramasastry, Government-to-
Citizen Online Dispute Resolution: A Preliminary Inquiry, 79 WASH. L. REv. 159, 167
(2004).
52 Martin, supra note 51, at 153.
53 Crawford, supra note 6, at 393 (mentioning the fact that, in the United States, this
requirement is a consequence of the Fair Credit Billing Act).
54 Id. at 395.
55 Julia H6mle, Online Dispute Resolution in Business to Consumer E-Commerce
Transactions, 2000 JILT § 2.7 (2002),
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2002_2/homle/ (last visited Sept. 5,
2007).
56 Crawford, supra note 6, at 394-95.
57 Louise Ellen Teitz, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Cyberspace:
The Promise and Challenge of Online Dispute Resolution, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 985,
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or mock trials conducted with retired judges or mock juries in order to get an
evaluation of one's case.58
After this general overview of the existing types of ODR providers, the
time has come to turn to the advantages and concerns perceived by legal
authors.
B. Advantages
Scholars having dealt with ODR can be divided into two categories. The
first, led by Ethan Katsh and Janet Riflin and by far the prominent trend in
ODR scholarship, focuses on the development of ODR to solve e-commerce
disputes, namely B2C and C2C transactions. 59 The second, led by Gabrielle
Kaufmann-Kohler and Thomas Schultz, is more interested in the
development of online arbitration, i.e. the use of the technology not only to
solve online disputes, but offline disputes as well.60 While online arbitration
faces specific issues, mainly as to its compatibility with the New York
Convention, scholars tend to deal with the same questions, so that one cannot
speak of several schools as to ODR scholarship. For this reason, we shall
deal with both categories together.
For obvious reasons, scholars interested in ODR are in favor of its
development and see it as a way-if not "the" way-to improve dispute
resolution processes in the future both as to online and offline disputes. There
is, however, little doubt that ODR presents several advantages as compared
to court systems.
1. Convenience
Unlike courts or arbitral tribunals, ODR providers are available twenty-
four hours a day and seven days a week; this feature enables the parties to
send e-mails or communicate at any time without having to travel long
997-98 (2001) (however, Teitz's references do not seem to exist any longer);
KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 45; H6rnle, supra note 55, at § 2.6
(mentioning that this type of service is in particular provided by the Better Business
Bureau (BBB), The Internet Ombudsman, NovaForum, WebAssured, Trusted Shops,
TrustUK, Econsumer scheme, and Howtocomplain.com).
58 SOLOVAY & REED, supra note 16, at 2-50; KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ,
supra note 9, at 43 (mentioning LegalVote, iCourthouse, and SettleTheCase).
5 9 ETHAN KATSH & JANET RIFKIN, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2001).
6 0 GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER & THOMAS SCHULTZ, ONLINE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: CHALLENGES FOR CONTEMPORARY JUSTICE 7 (Julian Lew ed., Kluwer Law
Int'l 2004).
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distances. 61 Some scholars consider the asynchronism of e-mail exchanges as
one advantage, since it allows the parties to think more thoroughly than in
verbal exchanges before actually sending their messages. 62 One may,
however, also argue that e-mails create an expectation to receive quick
answers, and that the frustration of not getting one immediately may raise
more negative than positive effects.
2. Low Costs63
One has to make a distinction between arbitration in a B2B framework
and ODR in a B2C or C2C environment. As to the former, it is quite hard to
know at this stage whether online arbitration would be cheaper than offline
arbitration, but doubts remain because online arbitration would mainly
consist of "assisted" online arbitration, i.e. the usage of technological tools to
manage the case, keep records, enhance communication, et cetera. On the
other hand, there is no doubt that in e-commerce, the possibility to refer to an
ODR provider in a B2C or C2C dispute is far cheaper than to go to court.
That fact is particularly true when the dispute arises between consumers and
merchants in different countries. For the consumers, ODR is not only
cheaper, it is often the single method of dispute resolution available, as one is
unlikely to be willing to bring a costly action into court for a small value at
stake, particularly if one has little chance of being able to enforce the
decision abroad.
61 Hang, supra note 31, at 854; Friedman, supra note 31, at 711; Shah, supra note
25, at 29; Baumann, supra note 10, at 1233; Ramasastry, supra note 51, at 161; Clark et
al., supra note 10, at 9; RULE, supra note 15, at 69; KATSH & RIFKIN, supra note 14, at
77-78 (dealing, however, with logistical and financial convenience). These authors note
that, from a technical point of view, the level of convenience may depend upon the
infrastructure at the parties' disposal.
62 KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 23; Shah, supra note 25, at 30;
Baumann, supra note 10, at 1233; RULE, supra note 15, at 63-64; Wahab, supra note 6,
at 130.
63 Hang, supra note 31, at 855; Friedman, supra note 31, at 712; Shah, supra note
25, at 29; Baumann, supra note 10, at 1233; Ramasastry, supra note 51, at 160-61; Clark
et al., supra note 10, at 9; PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 6, at 26-27; Wahab, supra
note 6, at 131.
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3. A void Jurisdiction Issues64
As previously mentioned, e-disputes will often arise between parties in
different legal systems. Considering the ubiquity of the Internet, conflicts-of-
laws issues are difficult to solve. Literature on this area is abundant, and the
American Law Institute (ALI) even has a project dealing with these issues in
the context of intellectual property disputes.65 To refer one's case to an ODR
provider enables the parties to avoid these difficult questions and their
uncertain outcomes, as they willingly agree to submit their dispute to a
common provider for which jurisdictional issues are to a very large extent
irrelevant.
4. Speed
The majority of legal scholars consider the potential for speed as the
main advantage of ODR.6 6 This is surely true for B2C and C2C disputes,
since litigation will usually last much longer than an ODR proceeding,
especially when the dispute involves parties coming from different
jurisdictions. In contrast, the same may not be true of offline arbitration,
particularly for B2B disputes. Does the mere use of technological tools allow
the proceedings to speed up? One may have doubts about it. In other words,
the speed potential is perhaps more likely the result of the usually non-
adjudicatory nature of ODR than of the use of technological devices. Thus, a
sub-question is whether the use of technology actually allows the
proceedings to speed up as most legal scholars seem to assume, when
experiments to the contrary tend to prove that computer-mediated disputes
take longer time to get solved than face-to-face ones.67 The situation is
64 Hang, supra note 31, at 856-57; Shah, supra note 25, at 30; Ramasastry, supra
note 51, at 161; Matthews & Stewart, supra note 39, at 1113-14; Chong, supra note 51,
at 21; Wahab, supra note 6, at 130.
65 The American Law Institute, Intellectual Property: Principles Governing
Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes,
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.projip&projectid=l (last visited Sept.
5, 2007). The reporters of this project are Professors Jane C. Ginsburg (Columbia),
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss (NYU), and Frangois Dessemontet (Lausanne). Id.
66 KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 58; Nicolas de Witt, Online
International Arbitration: Nine Issues Crucial To Its Success, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
441, 456 (2001); Shah, supra note 25, at 29; RULE, supra note 15, at 63; see Baumann,
supra note 10, at 1233; Clark et al., supra note 10, at 9.
67 See infra Part II.C.1.
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obviously different when ODR providers set up time limits to resolve the
disputes submitted to them.68
5. Others Advantages
Some authors present others advantages which seem contestable:
1) Legitimacy: Hang argues that "online users are more likely to adhere
to the judgments of their own virtual communities than the laws of
physical space far away from where they live." 69 The concept of
merchant law within close-knit cyber-communities is an interesting
one that deserves further analysis.70 While this concept already
proved to be effective in a B2B environment where transactions and
trade customs played the role of merchant laws, one may doubt that
the same can be said in a B2C environment, where the expectations
of the consumers will be different from merchants. Legitimacy, and
thus usage of ODR, can only exist if lex electronica is the result of a
consensus among all the stakeholders, particularly merchants and
consumers.
71
2) Non-confrontational Mechanism: Shah argues that the anonymous
nature of computer-mediated disputes might lead to a "dispassionate
approach to the merits of [the] cause" and be beneficial to the parties
who don't "trust each other or don't feel comfortable in front of each
other."72 There again, these are mere assumptions which need further
empirical research to get confirmed. One may alternatively wonder
whether the anonymous nature of computer-mediated disputes
prevents the building of trust and, consequently, a constructive
approach of negotiation or mediation processes.
68 See, e.g., KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 5 8-59.
69 Hang, supra note 31, at 856.
70 See generally Leon E. Trakman, From The Medieval Law Merchant to E-
Merchant Law, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 265 (2003).
71 Most scholars indeed favor a hybrid approach as to the adoption of standards
rather than a mere private or public basis. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Private Internet
Governance, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 87 (2003); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Creating a
Market for Justice; a Market Incentive Solution to Regulating the Playing Field: Judicial
Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and Fair Play in Online Consumer
Arbitration, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 32 (2002); Krause, supra note 25, at 469; Teitz,
supra note 57, at 1012.
72 Shah, supra note 25, at 30.
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Some of the advantages perceived by legal scholars can be disputed.
Asynchronism and non-confrontational mechanisms can only be considered
as advantages based upon certain assumptions that would need empirical data
to be confirmed. To my knowledge, not a single legal scholar has brought
evidence that confirms these alleged benefits. Before turning to the second
part of our study and referring to empirical data that contradicts these
assumptions, let's take a look at the concerns raised by legal scholars for the
future development of ODR.
C. Concerns
The main concerns raised by legal scholars can be divided into eight
categories:
1. Trust73
If ODR is to be successful, its users must have trust in the environment.
This is probably the biggest and toughest issue ODR designers have to work
on. Consumers have developed particular skills to discern whether trust or
distrust of sellers is warranted in an offline environment: they can see their
sellers in person, walk around the shop, and in case of any problem, go back
to the physical shop where body language and verbal interactions help them
to build trust or distrust. Such clues are nonexistent in cyberspace.
Consumers are not familiar with this new environment and the analytical
skills they developed over time in the real world do not work online. In other
words, consumers feel lost and, consequently, lack confidence. Numerous
papers have been written on this subject. 74 A first step towards the building
of trust is the use of trustmarks or seal programs.75 Logos are put on a
73 Clark et al., supra note 10, at 20-21; Homle, supra note 55, at § 3.1; Teitz, supra
note 57, at 1010; Krause, supra note 25, at 471-73; Baumann, supra note 10, at 1231;
Janice Nadler, Electronically-Mediated Dispute Resolution and E-Commerce, 17 NEGOT.
J. 334-37 (2001); see KATSH & RIFKIN, supra note 14, at 83-89.
74 See generally Rufus Pichler, Trust and Reliance-Enforcement and Compliance:
Enhancing Consumer Confidence in the Electronic Marketplace (2000) (unpublished
thesis, Stanford University) (on file with the Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution).
75 See Hang, supra note 31, at 848-49 (discussing the "TRUSTe" seal, or the
program developed by the Better Business Bureau); Friedman, supra note 31, at 705. For
information on the seal programs in general, see H6rnle, supra note 55, at § 3.2; Martin,
supra note 51, at 148-50; Ramasastry, supra note 51, at 165; Gibbons, supra note 71, at
32; Ponte, supra note 40, at 473; RULE, supra note 15, at 106-08; Teitz, supra note 57, at
995; see also SOLOVAY & REED, supra note 16, at 7-34.
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website to inform the consumer that the e-merchant meets the standards
defined by the seal provider. These programs are often related either with the
protection of privacy or with ODR systems. In either instance, they exist to
show a commitment towards consumer protection, to prove that business is
conducted seriously, and thus to appear credible and build trust. For the time
being, seal programs are the result of private initiatives. This results in a
multiplication of seal programs that do not mean anything for the consumer
due to a lack of marketing campaigns. Consequently, this diversity leads to
confusion among users, all the more than a single seal can potentially mean
many different things.76 To solve this problem, some authors have suggested
that seal programs should be developed by an independent international body
or a committee of government officials with the participation of consumer
advocacy groups and business representatives. 77 Others emphasize the need
to provide consumers with more detailed information as to the type of
services provided, the procedure, the profiles of neutrals, the costs involved,
and so forth.78
2. Due Process79
To be effective, ODR providers need to be trusted by consumers. To be
trusted, they need to be credible. Credibility requires the respect of due
process. In a digital environment, due process raises some questions:
As previously mentioned, due process requires transparency, first
through the deliverance of information to consumers, secondly
through the publication of the decisions. The publication of the
decisions is one of the best ways to assure the transparency of the
proceedings. 80 It would both enhance predictability and allow
consumers to get an idea of the degree of expertise of the ODR
provider and its neutrals. As pointed out by Teitz, transparency may,
76 Martin, supra note 51, at 149.
77 Id. at 150.
78 Gibbons, supra note 71, at 23, 26-27; Teitz, supra note 57, at 998; Baumann,
supra note 10, at 1239.
79 Clark et al., supra note 10, at 21; Gibbons, supra note 71, at 20-25; KAUFMANN-
KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 197-209; Nadler, supra note 73, at 342-44; Wahab,
supra note 6, at 146-471; see Martin, supra note 51, at 157; SOLOVAY & REED, supra
note 16, at 8-25; OECD, supra note 13.
80 Matthews & Stewart, supra note 39, at 1128-29; Ponte, supra note 40, at 477,
488-89; Hrmle, supra note 55, at § 4.2.1.
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however, not be desirable in all forms of ODR. 81 While publication
is probably not a concern for small claims, it surely will be one if
online arbitration were to develop for international business
transactions, i.e., in a B2B framework.
" Some authors have, for instance, wondered whether due process
allowed to the parties requires a face-to-face hearing. 82 In my
opinion, the general answer is no. While the right to be heard, i.e., to
be able to hear the other party's arguments, to present one's case, and
submit evidence is essential,83 most jurisdictions now admit that the
respect of this right does not necessarily involve a public hearing.
The same can be said in ODR, as tends to be proved by the UDRP
where public hearings are not conducted.84 This does not seem to be
a concern for the parties since the possibility of avoiding travel and
costs is traditionally considered as one of the main advantages of
ODR. One may, however, wonder whether the limited discovery
usually at the parties' disposal respects the due process
requirements. 85 Do the rules of an ODR provider that only accept
written submissions respect the due process requirements? Should
the parties be allowed to have witness hearings? While technology
may one day allow the hearing of witnesses at a distance, this still is
not the case. Do written depositions satisfy due process
requirements? Maybe, maybe not. Further research should be
conducted in this particular area.
* Others have wondered whether neutrals have to be independent. 86
* Finally, some pointed out that access to the procedure needs to be
easy, i.e. cost effective. 87 If one has to spend more than the amount
that is subject to the dispute, ODR will remain meaningless. Ideally,
ODR systems should be designed to enable the parties to use them
81 Teitz, supra note 57, at 1008.
82 de Witt, supra note 66, at 457.
83 Gibbons, supra note 71, at 23; H6mle, supra note 55, at § 4.1.
84 Teitz, supra note 57, at 1006 (sharing this opinion).
85 Krause, supra note 25, at 487 (considering that the lack of discovery will at least
be especially burdensome to complainants who carry the burden of proof); see PONTE &
CAVENAGH, supra note 6, at 33.
86 Gibbons, supra note 71, at 22; Hrmle, supra note 55, at § 4.1.1; SOLOVAY &
REED, supra note 16, at 8-17.
87 H6mle, supra note 55, at §§ 1, 5.
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without being obligated to use a legal representative. 88 Parties should
not, however, be deprived of the right to use a legal representative. 89
3. Funding
As Ramasastry correctly puts it, "[f]unding appears to be the crux of the
problem." 90 ODR systems need to remain extremely cheap, if not free, to
deal effectively with small claims. One may, therefore, wonder how these
systems will be funded in order to be profitable. While the bilateral payment
scheme, i.e. the payment of fees by the actual users of the system, is the
ordinary way to handle legal costs in ADR and court systems, alternatives
may be more appropriate for the development of ODR. Strangely enough,
while some authors raise this point,91 few have made sound proposals on this
crucial issue. Lucille M. Ponte suggests that:
Traditional businesses have purchased insurance packages to help pay legal
costs and damage awards for a wide range of tort matters. Innovative
private insurers could offer e-businesses insurance programs that also cover
the costs of ODR services for both the e-business and the online consumer.
Like most insurance programs, the expenses associated with ODR services
would be spread through premiums paid by participating e-businesses and
reflected in the price of goods and services offered to consumers. 92
Another alternative suggested by Ponte would be to obtain the support of
governments because they have a clear interest in reducing their caseloads. 93
While a partnership with public entities could be a solution, one may wonder
whether it would really reduce the courts' caseloads, because most e-disputes
that cannot be solved through ODR will never go to court. Alternatively,
Ramasastry evokes the membership scheme. In this system, used in several
seal programs, the e-merchant pays a certain fee to the seal providers
covering all or part of the fees of the ODR.94 This is, for instance, the case of
e-Bay, which actually pays part of the fees to SquareTrade. As pointed out by
Ramasastry, the problem with the membership scheme is that it raises
88 Gibbons, supra note 71, at 23.
89 Id. at 24.
90 Ramasastry, supra note 51, at 164.
91 Krause, supra note 25, at 485-86; SOLOVAY & REED, supra note 16, at 8.
92 Ponte, supra note 40, at 472-73; see also RULE, supra note 15, at 108.
93 Ponte, supra note 40, at 473.
94 Ramasastry, supra note 51, at 164-66.
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questions as to the independence of the ODR provider whose viability
depends upon the e-merchants. 95 Would an e-merchant be interested in
renewing its membership if it keeps losing cases? Would the neutrals-who
could be employees of the ODR provider-be influenced to a certain extent?
The funding of ODR providers raises a lot of issues that remain unanswered.
Further in-depth research on this particular issue is necessary if the systems
implemented are to be efficient and effective.
4. Privacy and Securiy 96
Most scholars emphasize the need for confidentiality, one of the key
features in ADR. While this is true of current ADR, in particular of
international commercial arbitration where the disputes are often of high
value, I am not sure that this is the case for ODR. It is true that the records
and communications between the parties and neutrals have to be kept private;
however, encryption technology currently satisfies this requirement. In any
case, even if we accept the possible development of online arbitration where
the confidentiality issue would probably matter, I do not think that
confidentiality is a main issue for small claims such as the ones currently
dealt with by ODR providers. This tends to be proved by the success of the
UDRP, which publishes all decisions online. The publication requirement has
never resulted in any comment or criticism from any stakeholder, who
probably considers that there is no need for any confidentiality in a dispute
over a domain name. In other words, I do not think that the "tension" feared
by Ramasastry "between transparency and confidentiality" will be a practical
hindrance to the development of ODR.97 Publication will instead allow
transparency, and thus help to build trust.
95 Id. at 165.
96 Clark et al., supra note 10, at 19-20; Shah, supra note 25, at 32; Turner, supra
note 25, at 144; Hang, supra note 31, at 859; Friedman, supra note 31, at 713; Katsh,
supra note 7, at 971; de Witt, supra note 66, at 462; Krause, supra note 25, at 489; PONTE
& CAVENAGH, supra note 6, at 128; RULE, supra note 15, at 81; SOLOVAY & REED, supra
note 16, at 8-2 1; Wahab, supra note 6, at 144-45.
97 Ramasastry, supra note 51, at 166.
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5. Validity of Online ODR Agreements98
It is important to make a distinction between B2B and B2C disputes. In
the B2C environment, while there is no doubt that arbitration agreements can
be concluded between businesses, the situation is more doubtful in the EU
when one of the parties is a consumer. The EU and the United States have
indeed approached consumer protection differently.99  According to
Crawford:
[I]n the 1998 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") . . .the United States "gutted e-consumer protection from the
agreement." The United States was concerned that the E.U. approach placed
too much responsibility on sellers to figure out consumer protection laws of
each separate country. The United States wished to "place more emphasis
on self-regulation by encouraging businesses to establish fair, effective and
transparent mechanisms rather than developing an international e-consumer
protection standard." The E.U. advocated the use of formalistic codes and
regulations adopted to ensure specific e-consumer protections, mirroring its
own strong consumer protections. 
100
In other words, while an arbitration clause contained in a contract of
adhesion which binds the consumer is likely to be deemed unfair within the
EU, consumer arbitration clauses are usually enforceable in the United
States. 101 This discrepancy is one of the main reasons for the current failure
of the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters. 10 2 The proposed Article 7.2 of the Hague Convention,
drafted under the influence of the EU countries, states that "a claim against
the consumer may only be brought by a person who entered into the contract
98 Clark et al., supra note 10, at 19; Shah, supra note 25, at 33; Friedman, supra note
31, at 714.
99 See John R. Aguilar, Over the Rainbow-European and American Consumer
Protection Policy and Remedy Conflicts on the Internet and a Possible Solution, 4 INT'L
J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (1999/2000); Crawford, supra note 6, at 388-89; Clark et al.,
supra note 10, at 15-16; Ponte, supra note 40, at 456-58; Teitz, supra note 57, at 992;
Chong, supra note 51, at 36-44; see generally KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra
note 9, at 171-72.
100 Crawford, supra note 6, at 388-89 (citation omitted).
101 H6rnle, supra note 55, at § 2.1; Ponte, supra note 40, at 450 (pointing out that,
"U.S. Courts have typically indicated that contracts of adhesion with consumers are not
automatically unenforceable but will be scrutinized for compliance with existing contract
law and with notions of fundamental fairness and reasonableness").
102 See generally Martin, supra note 51, at 141-47.
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in the course of its trade of profession before the courts of the State of the
habitual residence of the consumer." Such a clause is considered
unacceptable for the United States as it "would 'create an absolute rule
against choice of forum clauses [or arbitration agreements] in consumer
contracts."'' 10 3 At this stage, one has to' admit that the validity of online
arbitration agreements is more than doubtful when they involve an EU
consumer. In other words, while an e-merchant will have no right to impose
an ODR procedure towards an EU consumer, the latter will have the choice
between going to court or referring the case to the ODR provider.
On the other hand, in the B2B environment, arbitration has become the
usual way to solve international business transactions. The success met by
international commercial arbitration is partly due to one multilateral treaty
that enables the parties to easily enforce the awards anywhere in the world:
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, more commonly known as the New York Convention. 10 4 The
implication of technological tools in assisted online arbitration raises several
questions as to their compliance with the New York Convention. First of all,
Art. II of the New York Convention requires the arbitration agreement to be
made "in writing."10 5 Does an electronic agreement satisfy this requirement?
Considering the fact that an amendment of the New York Convention is an
illusion, 10 6  some authors recommend interpreting the "in writing"
requirement in compliance with Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, which defines "written" as any "other
means of telecommunication which provide a [written] record of the
agreement.' 0 7 As pointed out by Yu and Nasir:
103 Id at 143.
104 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 1958--Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards-the "New' York"
Convention,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html (last
visited Sept. 5, 2007).
105 de Witt, supra note 66, at 442-44; Matthews & Stewart, supra note 39, at 1134-
35; Hong-lin Yu & Motassem Nasir, Can Online Arbitration Exist Within the Traditional
Arbitration Framework?, 20 J. INT'L ARB. 455, 458 (2003); Friedman, supra note 31, at
714 (raising the same issue regarding the Federal Arbitration Act); Chong, supra note 51,
at 34-36; M.H.M. Schellekens, Online Arbitration and E-commerce, 9 ELECTRONIC
COMM. L. REV. 113, 120 (2002); SOLOVAY & REED, supra note 16, at 2-37.
106 To amend the New York Convention requires a unanimous decision of all the
members. Some authors' proposals to amend it remain totally academic and without any
practical relevance.
107 Gibbons, supra note 71, at 51 (adding that the United Kingdom Arbitration Act
also defines writing as "being recorded by any means").
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No one is in a position to ignore the fast development of cybertrade, which
has generated a large number of electronic contracts for the purpose of
international trade, such as e-bills of lading and electronic arbitration
agreements. Consequently, over the last decade both international
documents and national laws have started to address this development. 108
I share this opinion. Considering the recent legal developments and
importance gained by e-commerce, an extensive interpretation of the "in
writing" requirement should not be as problematic as it seems. Only the
future will say for sure. Another important issue for online arbitration is the
definition of the "seat of the arbitration."'1 9 The seat of arbitration first
determines the lex arbitri, i.e. the law applicable to the procedural aspects of
the arbitration when the arbitral tribunal seeks the assistance of local courts.
Most importantly, it defines the nationality of the award in the context of the
New York Convention and thus it's possibilities of enforcement. According
to Article I of the New York Convention, "[t]his Convention shall apply to
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a
State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such
awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether
physical or legal." Yu and Nasir argue in favor of the delocalization theory,
so as to detach the arbitration from controls imposed by the law of any
country, a solution that would lead to the application of some lex
mercatoria." 0
6. Enforcement'
Authors discuss several types of possible enforcement methods. To be
legally enforceable in another country, the ODR agreement needs to be valid,
which, as seen previously, raises serious concerns in the EU."12 While a
traditional legal enforcement requires the support of governments, the
Internet may offer others types of enforcement. Cona suggests that
108 Yu & Nasir, supra note 105, at 459.
109 de Witt, supra note 66, at 451-52; Yu & Nasir, supra note 105, at 462-64;
Schellekens, supra note 105, at 122-23.
110 Yu & Nasir, supra note 105, at 463-64; Chong, supra note 51, at 57-59.
111 See generally Shah, supra note 25, at 32; Hang, supra note 31, at 860;
KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 211; Krause, supra note 25, at 473-76;
Matthews & Stewart, supra note 39, at 1130-33; Chong, supra note 51, at 60-65;
SOLOVAY & REED, supra note 16, at 8-28.
112 See supra Part II.C.5.
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disconnection might be one type of enforcement. 113 While interesting, this
suggestion faces some practical hindrances. First, it would require the
support of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and their adherence to the ODR
in question. Second, to prohibit access to a website should only be a remedy
towards the consumer, not towards the e-merchant since a disconnection of
the website would surely be disproportionate. If an e-merchant were to face
disconnection of the website at every single claim, one could seriously doubt
any possible development of e-commerce. H6mle seems to suggest that
social norms may develop considering the role played by reputation in e-
commerce.11 4 Under this theory, e-merchants and their consumers could be
seen as a close-knit community where the bad behaviour of the one would
quickly lead to exclusion from the community. Gibbons, however, argues
that "[r]eputation is likely to be less effective in one-time consumer
transactions, particularly if consumers are isolated and sellers can readily
discriminate between sophisticated and unsophisticated buyers," and that
"[a]n anonymous e-consumer with a series of one-time transactions with
different e-merchants best describes the e-marketplace." 115 Several studies
indeed tend to prove that social sanctions only play a role within close-knit
communities that entertain ongoing relationships."16 Gibbons, however,
assumes that e-consumers are "one-shot" players on the e-market. 117 While
there is a lack of empirical data on this issue, this presumption seems
doubtful. At least anecdotally, e-consumers tend to go back to the same
website if they have once been satisfied with it and can therefore be
considered repeat players. In this case, reputation indeed plays a role. The
importance of reputation and social norms on the Internet tend to be proved
by e-Bay, where sellers are rated depending upon the satisfaction of the
client. E-consumers who go back to the website have the ability to see how
good or bad each seller is and decide whether or not they will enter into a
transaction with a particular seller.118 Studies about enforcement methods in
ODR are only at their infancy and need further in-depth research.
113 Cona, supra note 10, at 993.
114 Homle, supra note 55, at § 3.2; see also KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra
note 9, at 226-27.
115 Gibbons, supra note 71, at 28 (quoting, in part, Christopher Drahozal, "Unfair"
Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 695, 796 (2001)); see also Katsh et al., supra
note 31, at 714.
1 16 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHoUT LAW (1991).
117 Gibbons, supra note 71, at 13.
118 According to SquareTrade, lots of cases would have to deal with the rating of e-
merchants by consumers. Bad-rated e-merchants would file a complaint so as to reach an
agreement with unsatisfied consumers who would then agree to change their rating. If
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7. Education of Neutrals"19
Some authors have correctly wondered who would play the role of
mediators. If efficiency requires the design of low cost ODR systems, this
implies low fees for the neutrals. But who will agree to serve as neutral for
low fees? One can easily imagine that experienced arbitrators or mediators
would not be interested in serving for low fees. Could one think of junior
associates who could try and develop their skills through these small claims
disputes? Should the neutrals consist of customers and sellers, i.e. peers of
stakeholders, specifically trained to handle online disputes? In any case, there
is no doubt that the neutrals will have to be educated because online disputes
raise new psychological issues. 120
8. Lack of Human Interaction
Considering the amount of literature published by legal scholars about
ODR, it is quite surprising to notice that few authors have dealt with,' 2 ' or
primarily focused on the issue of human interaction. 122 It is all the more
surprising because this issue is crucial. While the legal issues can easily be
grasped and analyzed, it is much more difficult to understand how ODR
this is the case, it would prove that reputation indeed plays a role on the Internet. See
Katsh et al., supra note 31, at 729; but see RULE, supra note 15, at 105 ("Efforts at
creating a Web-wide rating system have had mixed results."). While this may be true in
general, there is little doubt that the rating system proves to be effective as far as eBay is
concerned.
119 Krause, supra note 25, at 483-85; Ponte, supra note 40, at 74; Clark et al., supra
note 10, at 22; SOLOVAY & REED, supra note 16, at 8-22; RULE, supra note 15, at 69-70
(stating that one advantage of ODR is the fact that parties may choose an expert in their
field). This, however, is an advantage of any type of ADR process, so the added value of
ODR as compared with traditional ADR is not easily discerned. For a listing of
advantages of ODR for neutrals, see RULE, supra note 15, at 71-76. As to the relevant
criteria to choose a mediator, see Baumann, supra note 10, at 1234-35. For issues related
to neutrals generally, see RULE, supra note 15, at 239-44.
120 See infra Part III.
121 E.g., Ethan Katsh, Online Dispute Resolution: Some Lessons from the E-
Commerce Revolution, 28 N. Ky. L. REv. 810, 816 (2001); Katsh, supra note 7, at 974;
KATSH & RIFKIN, supra note 14, at 150-51; Cona, supra note 10, at 992; Krause, supra
note 25, at 481-83; PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 6, at 32-33; RULE, supra note 15, at
45-46, 83-84; Yu & Nasir, supra note 105, at 456.
122 E.g., Janice Nadler, Electronically Mediated Dispute Resolution and E-
Commerce, 17 NEGOT. J. 333 (2001); David A. Larson, Online Dispute Resolution: Do
You Know Where Your Children Are?, 19 NEGOT. J. 199 (2003).
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proceedings are perceived by the stakeholders as compared to courts or
offline ADR systems. I hope that this paper will fill that void and be the
starting point of further discussions.
D. Preliminary Conclusion
The phenomenon of ODR has drawn the attention of numerous legal
scholars as well as governments and public organizations. While all of them
recognize the importance of providing efficient dispute resolution methods to
the consumer in order to increase e-commerce, several concerns remain
unanswered. Two of them are crucial and deserve further investigation: the
funding of providers and the building of trust between the parties. To build
trust, I believe that one has to understand the psychological difference of
perceptions between computer-mediated-disputes and face-to-face
interactions. This issue has never been addressed in sufficient depth by legal
scholars. I hope to fill that void by using empirical data resulting from
experiments conducted by psychologists in Part C of this paper.
III. COMPUTER-MEDIATED-DISPUTES: A NEW DIMENSION?
A. Computer-Mediated Communication Theories
1. Introduction
The first experiments dealing with computer-mediated-communications
(CMC) were conducted in the 1970s and 1980s, and at that time the main
focus was to determine the factors that influenced impression formation.123
Psychologists were interested in trying to find out "the extent to which the
CMC environment modifies or eliminates many of the cues and sources of
information that have been identified as important in traditional impression
formation research." 124
The most obvious feature of CMC disputes as compared with face-to-
face (F2F) disputes is the absence of non-verbal cues, such as facial
expression, bodily gestures, and tone of voice or language, which obviously
play an important role in F2F. That deficit is important, as pointed out by
Kiesler and Sproull, because people come to understand social order through
123 Jeffrey T. Hancock & Philip J. Dunham, Impression Formation in Computer-
Mediated Communication Revisited, 28 COMM. RES. 325, 326 (2001).
124 Id.
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"static" 125 and "dynamic" 126 social context cues, and "[o]nce people perceive
social context cues, they adjust their targets of communication, the tone and
content of their communications, and their conformity to social norms." 127
This was confirmed by Knutson, who demonstrated that facial expressions of
emotions convey messages of both dominance and affiliation to observers
which may "seed" interpersonal inferences for the future. 128 Eye contact has,
for instance, been shown to be a cue for dominance, friendliness, approval,
romantic love, status relationships, and speech synchronization. 129 Social
cues are important to build interpersonal "rapport," which has been described
by Thompson and Nadler as containing three components: "(1) mutual
attentiveness (i.e., my attention is focused on you and your attention is
focused on me), (2) positivity (i.e., we are friendly to each other), and (3)
coordination (i.e., we are in sync, so that we each react spontaneously to the
other)."'130 In other words, "rapport" can be described as "a state of mutual
positivity and interest that arises through the entrainment of expressive
behavior in an interaction."1 31 F2F allows more "rapport" than CMC, which
in turns lead to more trust and thus more cooperation.1 32
The ease of perceiving nonverbal cues allows a classification of
communication media depending upon their "information richness,"
"richness" being "defined as the potential information-carrying capacity of
125 Sara Kiesler & Lee Sproull, Group Decision Making and Communication
Technology, 52 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 96, 102 (1992) ("Static cues
emanate from artifacts such as the chair at the head of a conference table" or the
appearance of people's suits).
126 Id. ("Dynamic cues emanate from people's behaviors" such as nodding,
frowning, shaking one's head, etc.)
127 Id
128 Brian Knutson, Facial Expressions of Emotion Influence Interpersonal Trait
Inferences, 20 J. NONVERBAL BEHAV. 165, 179 (1996).
129 Ederyn Williams, Experimental Comparisons of Face-to-Face and Mediated
Communication: A Review, 84 PSYCHOL. BULL. 963, 971 (1977).
130 Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Negotiating via Information Technology:
Theory and Application, 58 J. Soc. ISSUES 109, 111 (2002).
131 Aimee L. Drolet & Michael W. Morris, Rapport in Conflict Resolution:
Accounting for How Face-to-Face Contact Fosters Mutual Cooperation in Mixed-Motive
Conflicts, 36 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCHO. 26, 28 (2000).
132 Thompson & Nadler, supra note 130, at 111; Drolet & Morris, supra note 131, at
26, 33-34; Williams, supra note 129, at 968-69; see generally M. Mtihlfelder et al.,
Teams Without Trust? Investigations in the Influence of Video-Mediated Communication
on the Origin of Trust Among Cooperating Persons, 18 BEHAV. & INFO. TECH. 349
(1999).
327
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
data."'133 CMC has thus traditionally been referred to as lower in social
presence. 134 F2F obviously is the richest media since it allows the
simultaneous perception of multiple cues. 135 The telephone medium is less
rich; while its feedback capacity is as fast as F2F, visual cues are unavailable
so that the parties have to rely upon language content and audio cues to reach
understanding. 136 Written communication is the poorest communication
medium since feedback is slow and cues are limited to what is written on
paper. 137
Based upon this "richness information" scheme, authors have argued that
media low in richness were only suited to simple topics and routine problems
which are already understood and do not need further clarifications.
However, complex tasks which require organization and rapid feedback
would have to be dealt with rich media. 138 Experiments conducted in the
1970s showed that both the richness of the medium and the amount of
information increase with the perceived uncertainty, thus leading managers
to have a strong preference for verbal media rather than written
communication. 139 Scholars thus considered in the 1980s that "audio and
video conferences are perceived as effective for tasks involving exchanging
information, asking questions, and exchanging opinions, but are not as
satisfactory as FtF for high social presence functions such as getting to know
133 Richard L. Daft & Robert H. Lengel, Information Richness: A New Approach to
Managerial Behavior and Organization Design, 6 RES. IN ORG. BEHAV. 191, 196 (1984);
Mei Du et al., The Effects of Multimedia Communication on Web-Based Negotiation, 12
GROUP DECISION & NEGOT. 89, 91-92 (2003).
134 Joseph B. Walther & Judee K. Burgoon, Relational Communication in
Computer-Mediated Interaction, 19 HuM. COMM. RES. 50, 53 (1992); Ronald E. Rice &
Gail Love, Electronic Emotion-Socioemotional Content in a Computer-Mediated
Communication Network, 14 COMM. REs. 85, 87 (1987); Starr Roxanne Hiltz et al.,
Experiments in Group Decision Making-Communication Process and Outcome in Face-
to-Face Versus Computerized Conferences, 13 HuM. COMM. RES. 225, 228 (1986); Sara
Kiesler et al., Social Psychological Aspects of Computer-Mediated Communication, 39
AM. PSYCHOL. 1123, 1125, 1131 (1984).
135 Daft & Lengel, supra note 133, at 196-98.
136 Id. at 198; Williams, supra note 129, at 967-68 (stating that some thirty years
ago, "[r]esults showed significantly more cooperation in the audio and vision condition
(87% cooperative responses), with lower cooperation for audio-only (72% cooperative),
vision-only (48% cooperation), and no-communication (41% cooperative) conditions").
137 Daft & Lengel, supra note 133, at 198. For more on these differences, see
Kielser & Sproull, supra note 125, at 103.
138 Daft & Lengel, supra note 133, at 199-200, 221, 223.
139 Id. at 201-02; see Drolet & Morris, supra note 131, at 27.
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people bargaining, and negotiation."' 140 In other words, CMC would only be
suited for non socio-emotional tasks.14' Despite this assertion, Williams
states that:
[R]esults suggest the medium of communication can affect the impressions
that people gain of each other, with the effect generally being that the media
that are richer in nonverbal cues lead to more favourable impressions.
However, this effect does not appear to be particularly strong, in that it
sometimes fails to be detected and is never highly significant statistically,
even when fairly large numbers of subjects are used. 14 2
Besides, according to Drolet and Morris, dyads who communicate in F2F
conversation exhibit a higher degree of rapport (positive affect and
cooperation), than the ones who communicate by telephone. Nevertheless,
they do not seem to have more expectations at the outset. In other words,
expectations of the counterpart's cooperativeness played no role. 143
2. Cues Filtered-Out Model
Since the 1970s, theories related to CMC have evolved. The first
approach has focused on the lack of nonverbal cues and has consequently
been defined as the Cues Filtered-Out Perspective (CFO). 144 According to
Hancock and Dunham, "[t]he unifying theme central to these approaches is
that the reduction of nonverbal social and relational cues in CMC produces a
depersonalized form of communication and decreased awareness of others,
inhibiting interpersonal relations."'145 Experiments conducted by Morris have
indeed shown that perceptions of the other side were more positive when
participants had seen a picture of their opponents both before and after the
negotiation. 146
140 Hiltz et al., supra note 134, at 228.
141 Rice & Love, supra note 134, at 89; see also Duet al., supra note 133, at 92.
142 Williams, supra note 129, at 969.
143 Drolet & Morris, supra note 131, at 40.
144 Hancock & Dunham, supra note 123, at 326.
145 Id. at 326 (citations omitted).
146 Don A. Moore et al., Long and Short Routes to Success in Electronically
Mediated Negotiations: Group Affiliations and Good Vibrations, 77 ORG. BEHAv. HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 22, 31, 35 (1999).
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3. Social Identification/Deindividuation Model
In the beginning of the 1990s, CFO theory was challenged by the social
identification/deindividuation (SIDE) model. 147 Unlike the CFO model, the
SIDE model admits that, despite the low richness of written texts, socio-
emotional content is nevertheless possible. 148 However, due to the lack of
individuating cues, parties will tend to rely upon the few remaining social
cues they can get; consequently, they will construct more stereotyped and
exaggerated representations of their partners. 149 Walther has described this
phenomenon as "overattribution."' 150 This will lead to strong positive feelings
towards people who perceive each other as part of the same group, thus
building a group identity. 151 This "social identity theory" suggests that the
more similar we perceive others to be, the more cooperative and trusting we
are and, conversely, negative perceptions as to outgroup members will be
exaggerated, a phenomenon described as "sinister attribution error." 152 In
1999, Morris however showed that this "sinister attribution error" could be
corrected if the outgroup members engage in mutual self-disclosure. 15 3
Morris concludes that negotiations between people who engage in self-
disclosure or who are considered as belonging to the same group achieve
similar agreement rates. 154
4. Social Information-Processing Model
In the mid 1990s, Walther developed a new model called the social
information-processing (SIP) or hyperpersonal theory. This model focuses on
developmental processes in CMC. As put by Walther:
The SIP approach held that because all social information, as well as all
task information, travels through one code system-a system in which even
verbal messages travel slower than they do in oral speech-the expression
147 Hancock & Dunham, supra note 123, at 327; Joseph B. Walther, Group and
Interpersonal Effects in International Computer-Mediated Collaboration, 23 HUM.
COMM. REs. 342, 346 (1997).
148 Hancock & Dunham, supra note 123, at 327.
149 Id.
150 Walther, supra note 147, at 346.
151 Hancock & Dunham, supra note 123, at 327.
152 Thompson & Nadler, supra note 130, at 119; Walther, supra note 147, at 346.
153 Moore et al., supra note 146, at 38.
154 Id. at 38.
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and processing of information is retarded in CMC relative to FtF
communication. As such information accumulates, however, participants
reduce uncertainty about their partners and develop interpersonal
relationships. 15 5
In other words, "[t]he major thrust of social information-processing
theory is that CMC retards the rate at which impression-relevant cues are
exchanged during social interaction, rather than simply reducing or
eliminating the amount of such information. Communicators are assumed to
take an active role in forming impressions through text-based
information."1 56 In other words, while social cues may be lacking in the
beginning of the communications and lead to exaggerated impressions, this
deficiency should disappear over time as the parties learn more about each
other.
The hyperpersonal model currently is the leading model. Experiments
have, for instance, demonstrated that in a one-time interaction, CMC
participants were willing to rate their partners on a smaller array of attributes
than F2F, but that they did it in a more extreme way.157 However, it is
interesting to note that participants in these experiments were able to rate
their partners on more than half of the attributes. 158 In other words, while
CMC undoubtedly carries less information than F2F, it would be wrong to
assume that it does not contain any socio-emotional content at all. As most
people using a computer and the Internet can now confirm, written texts can
convey several messages and style, grammar, and spelling mistakes are
relevant factors to get a first picture, which may indeed be exaggerated, of
the person we are "talking" to.159 Thompson and Nadler even suggested that
participants nonconsciously imitate both the linguistic structure of each
other's message (i.e. length and grammar) and the SE connotations of the
other's message (i.e. tone, directness) as well as the rate of replies. 160 In
1992, Walther and Burgoon examined relational development over time in
CMC and F2F communication; they concluded that "participants in both
155 Walther, supra note 147, at 348; see also Walther & Burgoon, supra note 134 at
77.
156 Hancock & Dunham, supra note 123, at 328.
157 Id. at 339. In other words, on a scale from 1 to 10, CMC participants would rate
their partner on a smaller array of attributes than F2F participants, but would grade each
attribute closer to 10 than F2F participants would do, thus grading each attribute in an
extreme way.
158 Id.
159 See Rice & Love, supra note 134, at 88.
160 Thompson & Nadler, supra note 130, at 113.
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conditions increased over time to similarly affiliative levels of intimacy and
affection, reduced dominance, and greater social (versus task) orientation. 1 61
As demonstrated by Rice and Love in 1987, the correlation between the total
number of socio-emotional sentences and the number of messages does,
however, not mean that initial messages among previously unacquainted
interactants in CMC are lower in immediacy and affection than are later
messages. 162 Walther and Burgoon confirmed this outcome five years
later. 163 The fact that SE content does not necessarily increase in percentage
over time does not, however, contradict the fact that the parties get to know
each other better over time.
Walther's model currently is the dominant one in the literature, even
though his opinion might be exaggerated. 164 To sum up, one may say that,
quoting Walther, "[a]ll things considered, although initial differences in
relational communication between CMC and FtF may exist, they tend to be
eliminated over time . . . . The ways in which humans pursue these
interpersonal functions are more robust than can be impeded for long by
computer-mediation."' 165 One may therefore confidently affirm that: "FtF
contact between negotiators is not always necessary to build rapport. Some
social, personalizing contact between negotiators communicating via written
media can build rapport, as can common in-group membership. There
appears to be more than one path to rapport."' 166
This condensed "historical" background of CMC theories clearly shows
that the key mediating factor is rapport. Communication "leads to increased
perceptions of the counterpart's cooperativeness and, in turn, to increased
cooperation."' 167 Mutual self-disclosure prior to commencing negotiation is
thus important to secure a positive relationship, build rapport, and
consequently facilitate cooperation.168
161 Walther, supra note 147, at 349; Walther & Burgoon, supra note 134, at 50.
162 Rice & Love, supra note 134, at 98 ("the proportion of SE [socio-emotional]
content does not increase over time .... This result implies that users do not 'warm up' to
a CMC system to display their propensity toward sending SE messages").
163 Walther & Burgoon, supra note 134, at 70.
164 Id. at 79 ("CMC members attempted to reduce uncertainty by overcompensating
in the direction of playfulness, affection, and depth").
165 Id. at 81.
166 Moore et al., supra note 146, at 39.
167 Drolet & Morris, supra note 131, at 34; see generally Charles E. Naquin &
Gaylen D. Paulson, Online Bargaining and Interpersonal Trust, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
113, 117-18 (2003).
168 Moore et al., supra note 146, at 26, 40; Miihlfelder et al., supra note 132, at 353;
Hiltz et al., supra note 134, at 246; see Thompson & Nadler, supra note 130, at 121; see
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After these general remarks as to the main differences between CMC and
F2F, time has come to turn to the different types of ODR described in the
first part of my study and to wonder how these tools might psychologically
be perceived by the users based upon specific experiments conducted in the
past.
B. Technological Tools
By "technological tools," I refer to ODR systems that provide the parties
with technological tools at the exclusion of any human intervention, such as a
credit card chargeback system or automated negotiation. Considering the fact
that credit card chargeback systems do not involve any interaction between
the parties at all, they can be excluded from the study. While automated
negotiation such as Cybersettle does not involve any interaction between the
parties either, as they only get into contact through the automated bidding
process, one may still wonder what the parties' expectations and anticipations
are prior to entering into the process and during the process itself. Do the
parties have high expectations? Does their behavior change during the
process itself?
Gabuthy and Marchand attempted to answer these questions at the CNRS
in Lyon, France, in order to find out whether automated negotiation was
effectively able to generate efficiency. 169 Based on forty rounds of
bargaining, the authors concluded that behaviors were significantly affected
by the design of automated negotiation.' 70 For these authors, the computer
software appears as a neutral who would drive the parties' strategies outside
the range of potential negotiated settlements and create a prisoner's dilemma
situation. 71 Instead of encouraging them to reach the best mutual outcome,
automated negotiation "encourages disputants to behave strategically by
adopting aggressive bargaining positions, which implies that the mechanism
is not able to promote agreements and generate efficiency .... Automated
negotiation tends to 'chill' bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals
to misrepresent their true valuations and discourage them to converge on
generally Kathleen L. Valley et al., A Matter of Trust: Effects of Communication on the
Efficiency and Distribution of Outcomes, 34 J. Eco. BEHAV. & ORG. 211 (1998).
169 Yannick Gabuthy & Nad6ge Marchand, Does Resorting to Online Dispute
Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence (Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique, Working Paper No. 04-01) (2004) (Fr.), available at
http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/documentation/workingpapers/2004/0401.pdf (last visited Sept.
14, 2007).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 7-8.
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their own.' 172 Concretely, the plaintiff will adopt an under-efficient behavior
by asking an amount higher than his reservation value. 173 Interestingly, the
experiment also shows that, in presence of a high conflict situation, parties
tend to behave more efficiently and to adopt a more concessionary
behavior. 174
One could therefore infer from this experiment that parties experience
negative anticipation when using automated negotiation and tend to react in a
more defensive way than would be the case in a traditional framework,
except in high conflict situations. This outcome may explain why automated
negotiation's main success is related to insurance claims where the pure
monetary system of settlement is totally depersonalized. Considering the
recent development and usage of automated negotiation, experiments remain
extremely rare and lots of questions remains unanswered. Further research
should be conducted to get a better idea of the perceptions of participants
with regard to these procedures.
C. Assisted Negotiation
Unlike automated negotiation, assisted negotiation allows the parties to
directly interact with one another through different technological tools, the
most common being e-mail. We shall thus focus on CMC involving the use
of e-mails, and later focus on audiovisual tools that will probably be more
frequently used in the future.
1. Use ofE-mail
In order to compare CMC and F2F interactions, it is worth mentioning
the specific features of F2F. According to Kiesler and Sproull these
characteristics are the following ones:
1) one and only one person has the floor at any one time; except for
momentary silences, someone is always holding the floor;
2) speakers cannot pause too briefly or for too long a time;
3) speakers exercise some control over who the next speaker will be, as
well as when they can interrupt;
4) speakers signal transitions using multiple cues in different modalities
or channels;
172 Id. at 1.
173 Id. at 16.
174 Id. at 10.
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5) there is no anonymity in face-to-face groups;
6) group members share time unequally. 175
The passage from F2F to CMC questions all these features, as well as
others.
First of all, one may think that the use of technological tools speeds up
the negotiation process and its outcome. However, that assumption turns out
to be wrong. As several scholars have pointed out, CMC participants take
longer than F2F participants to achieve a similar outcome. 176 Kiesler and
Sproull found that it took four times as long for a three-person group to make
a decision and ten times as long for a four-person group. 177 There are three
explanations offered to explain this difference. 178 To begin, technological
deficiencies could be slowing down the transmission. While this might have
been a relevant explanation some years ago, this surely is not the case any
longer. Another possible explanation is that it could take "people longer to
type and read than to talk and listen."'179 Consequently, there might be more
communication and exchanges of information during a F2F meeting than
during a computerized one that lasts the same amount of time. 180 The same
could be true even if, in the end, the total number of messages exchanged in
order to reach an agreement are the same. 181 Finally, the lack of nonverbal
cues could prevent the parties from strategically adapting their position to
quickly reach an optimal outcome based upon each other's reactions.] 82
Secondly, unlike F2F interactions, there is not necessarily always
someone talking in CMC, and the asynchronism due to e-mail exchanges
allows interruptions and absences. While a few scholars depict this
asynchronism as an advantage, since it allows the parties to thoroughly think
about their respective positions before posting their messages, 183 others
175 Kiesler & Sproull, supra note 125, at 102 (referring on that point to McGrath and
Hollingshead).
176 Hancock & Durham, supra note 123, at 338; Drolet & Morris, supra note 131, at
33, 46; see Williams, supra note 129, at 965.
177 Kiesler & Sproull, supra note 125, at 108.
178 Id.
179 Kiesler & Sproull, supra note 125, at 108.
180 Hiltz et al., supra note 134, at 236, 243; Sara Kiesler, Thinking Ahead-The
Hidden Messages in Computer Networks, 64 HARv. Bus. REv. 46, 52 (1986).
181 Walther & Burgoon, supra note 134, at 54.
182 Kiesler & Sproull, supra note 125, at 108.
183 Moore et al., supra note 146, at 39; KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note
9, at 23; Baumann, supra note 10, at 1233.
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believe this slows down the process and can lead to frustration for parties
expecting a quick answer to their messages. 184 The use of technology also
prevents the parties from immediately clarifying their position or correcting
it so as to prevent misunderstandings. This is a disadvantage of the
asynchronism of e-mail exchanges and is another factor which explains the
longer time needed to reach an agreement in CMC than in F2F.
Third, and as mentioned previously, CMC is an impoverished medium as
compared to the F2F medium. The absence of nonverbal cues leads to two
main consequences as to the way the parties approach the process itself.
First, the parties tend to be more task-oriented than in F2F. 185 While this
absence of distraction might be seen as an advantage, 186 it actually is not
since rapport is a key factor to build trust and enhance cooperation. 187
Second, the parties tend to be uninhibited and to speak more strongly in
CMC than in F2F, a result known as "flaming."'188 For obvious reasons,
people find it easier to say what they think to an anonymous and
dehumanized person than to someone made of flesh and bones. Experiments
have demonstrated "that e-mail encourages uninhibited and aggressive
communications because e-mailers are less influenced by social norms in this
environment." 189 Remarks containing swearing, insults, name calling, and
hostile comments are eight times more frequent in CMC than in F2F
184 Thompson & Nadler, supra note 130, at 117; Sara Kiesler et al., Social
Psychological Aspects of Computer-Mediated Communication, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 1123,
1125 (1984).
185 Thompson & Nadler, supra note 130, at 115; Walther, supra note 147, at 343;
contra Walther & Burgoon, supra note 134, at 76.
186 Williams, supra note 129, at 973.
187 See supra Part III.A. 1.
188 Kiesler et al., supra note 184, at 1129; Walther & Burgoon, supra note 134, at
53; Kiesler, supra note 180, at 48, 52.
189 Elaine M. Landry, Scrolling Around the New Organization: The Potential for
Conflict in the On-Line Environment, 16 NEGOT. J. 133, 139 (2000). Colin Rule is
therefore wrong when he writes that:
Because of the asynchronous nature of online communication and the lack of face-
to-face immediacy, online communication is often less likely to escalate to
accusations, name calling, and violence than face-to-face communication. In
addition to simply having more time to think about what you want to say, the
emotional heat that can be generated by face-to-face confrontation is less intense in
online interaction. This dynamic has come to be called cooling distance.
RULE, supra note 15, at 66.
336
[Vol. 23:2 2008]
FROM FACE-TO-FACE TO SCREEN-TO-SCREEN
discussions.' 90 Thompson and Nadler speak of "counternormative e-
behaviour" to describe this phenomenon. 19 1 Some scholars have, however,
contested the idea that flaming would be a generalized phenomenon in CMC,
and assume that it would only appear in some CMC groups. 192 No empirical
data has been brought to confirm this assumption. Nonetheless, it may be
true. As seen previously, the urge to belong to the same group might
compensate for the lack of identification. One may therefore assume that
negotiations among in-group members would result in less flaming than
negotiations among out-group members. Experiments tend, in any case, to
prove that in-group members reach better outcomes than out-group
members. 193 There is little doubt that the desire to entertain ongoing relations
with the other party will also increase the exchange of social information and
prevent flaming. 194 What remains sure is that anger is disruptive and leads to
a lower rate of settlement. ' 95
The lack of nonverbal cues also has advantages. In F2F meetings, talking
time is not distributed equally among participants. 196 Social and hierarchical
status plays an important role. 197 The relative anonymity of CMC allows a
democratization and equalization of the whole process.198 Experiments have
shown that the trend for dominance increases over time in F2F negotiation
while it decreases in CMC. 19 9 For example, while male executives are five
times more likely to make the first proposal than female executives in F2F,
women make the first proposal as often as men in CMC. 200 As Kiesler puts
190 Thompson & Nadler, supra note 130, at 119; Kiesler & Sproull, supra note 125,
at 110.
191 Thompson & Nadler, supra note 130, at 119.
192 Walther, supra note 147, at 347.
193 Moore et al., supra note 146, at 25, 32, 38; Landry, supra note 189, at 139;
Thompson & Nadler, supra note 130, at 116.
194 See Walther, supra note 147, at 349.
195 Ray Friedman et al., The Positive and Negative Effects of Anger on Dispute
Resolution: Evidence from Electronically Mediated Disputes, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
369, 373 (2004).
196 Kiesler & Sproull, supra note 125, at 102.
197 Kiesler & Sproull, supra note 125, at 102.
198 Williams, supra note 129, at 970 ("[The a]mount of participation, in terms of
numbers of messages, was most equal with teletypewriter communication, less equal with
audio only, and least equal when the discussion was face to face"); Landry, supra note
189, at 135; Hiltz et al., supra note 134, at 239; RULE, supra note 15, at 68.
199 Walther & Burgoon, supra note 134, at 74.
200 Kiesler & Sproull, supra note 125, at 109; see Kiesler et al., supra note 184, at
1125.
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it, "Eliminating surveillance and social feedback, like laughter or a frown,
reduces any embarrassment over being considered foolish and eliminates a
feeling of obligation to respond in a certain way. Hence even busy, shy, or
obnoxious people can communicate comfortably. " 20 1 One can therefore
consider that dominance is less strong of a factor in CMC groups.202
All in all, experiments tend to show that CMC creates less consensus,203
and thus leads to more impasses than F2F. 204 Rapport seems to be the key,
since the rate of agreements clearly increases when there is personalization or
a feeling of belonging to the same group. 205 When the parties reach an
agreement, there is a dispute as to whether quality is affected. For Hiltz,
Johnson, and Turoff, there does not seem to be any difference. 20 6 According
to them, "for both modes combined, quality of decision is positively related
to the proportion of communications showing solidarity and giving
suggestions and negatively related to showing tension release and giving
orientation. '" 20 7 Valley, Moag, and Bazerman, however, consider that F2F
negotiations result in greater joint gains than those carried out in writing
since the level of cooperation is higher.20 8
2. Use ofAudiovisual Means
The use of audiovisual means currently remains the exception in ODR.
However, one can expect that their usage will increase in the future.
Audiovisual means are probably the closest to F2F so far and can thus be
considered a rich media. This was demonstrated by Williams, according to
whom participants using audio and visual means showed 87% of cooperative
responses, which was more than any other means.20 9
According to Williams, reporting an experiment conducted by others,
''participants in the audio-only condition felt that their ideas were less
understood and accepted than was the case for the audio-video or face-to-
201 Kiesler, supra note 180, at 58.
202 Kiesler et al., supra note 184, at 1129; Landry, supra note 189, at 136.
203 Walther, supra note 147, at 343; Kiesler & Sproull, supra note 125, at 112.
204 Williams, supra note 129, at 973; see Valley et al., supra note 168, at 219, 224;
Hiltz et al., supra note 134, at 236.
205 Thompson & Nadler, supra note 130, at 116; see Moore et al., supra note 146, at
32, 37.
206 Hiltz et al., supra note 134, at 240, 244.
207 Id. at 244.
208 Valley et al., supra note 168, at 221.
209 Williams, supra note. 129, at 967.
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face subjects." 2 10 In other words, there is a preference for audio-video
conversations over audio-only conversations. 2 11 This being said, one should
not necessarily assume that audiovisual means are identical to F2F. In the
1970s, William writes that:
[T]he second practical implication is that audio-video media seem not to be
as effective as was suspected at first. Early enthusiasm that such media were
'just like face to face' has not been confirmed, and in most of the previously
mentioned experiments, audio-video has turned out to be more similar to
audio only than to face to face .. . .Considering the considerable cost
disadvantages of audio-video media .. .this does not augur well for the
long-term future of the video-phone or other video media.212
In short, audiovisual means would be closer to audio means than F2F,
even though F2F and audiovisual means are a richer media than mere audio.
These reflections have been confirmed recently. In 1999, an experiment
conducted by Mtihlfelder showed that video-conferencing had "a negative
impact on the origin of trust because it reduced the accuracy of the
assessment," and as a result, it could not be assimilated to F2F.213 In 2003,
Yuan, Head, and Du demonstrated that the addition of video to audio means
did not have any significant influence upon the outcome of the
negotiations.214
The poor quality of the image obviously plays a role in these results.
Technology nonetheless makes progress. In an experiment conducted in
2001, Gary Bente and his team found that computer-animated movement led
to remarkable similarities in the impression ratings as under F2F conditions,
"indicating that most of the relevant social information available to observers
in the video recordings was also conveyed by computer animations. ' 215 The
assimilation of audiovisual means to F2F might be closer than we could think
if one refers to the more and more common usage by law firms of
videoconferences with clients located overseas. According to some attorneys
who do not want to be mentioned, the quality of the image allows
interactions that are similar to the ones met under F2F conditions. In other
210 Id. at 969.
211 Id. at 968.
2 12 Id. at 973.
213 Miilfelder et al., supra note 132, at 356-57.
214 Du et al., supra note 133, at 101-03.
215 Gary Bente et al., Computer Animated Movement and Person Perception:
Methodological Advances in Nonverbal Behavior Research, 25 J. NONVERBAL BEHAV.
151, 151 (2001).
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words, while older generations may find it hard to negotiate screen-to-screen
through audiovisual means, it may become the rule for a younger generation
of attorneys that have knowledge of and access to high quality technological
devices.
D. Online Mediation
Online mediation involves the intervention of a third party called the
neutral. All the experiments conducted so far focus on the interactions
between the parties, and mainly on negotiation. One may wonder what the
influence of the medium is upon the neutral. There is little doubt that a
neutral having to mediate a case online rather than offline will have to
behave differently. Obviously, the absence of nonverbal cues makes the role
of the neutral more complicated since he or she cannot use these signals to
strategically adapt an attitude. Even though software now enables the neutral
to caucus privately with the parties, the neutral may find it hard to calm down
an irritated party through the mere use of e-mails. The feeling of remoteness
for the neutral may ultimately lead to frustration. New skills will thus have to
be developed, and new models will have to be found to educate online
mediators.216 Research on this crucial issue is lacking and empirical research
is needed to develop new educational models.
E. Online Arbitration
To my knowledge, no empirical study related to online arbitration has
been conducted so far. Unlike others types of ADR, arbitration presents two
differences that are relevant for my study. First, it is the only form of ADR
that has an adjudicatory nature. Second, arbitration is governed by rules that
are far more formal than other types of ADR. In arbitration, parties have to
submit briefs directly to the arbitrator at a given time. There is no direct
contact between the parties, so that all the issues previously described and
related to the exchange of e-mails have little relevance in online arbitration.
Besides, they have to submit their briefs following certain rules that exclude
socio-emotional content. Formalism hardly leaves any room to nonverbal
behaviour, and it hardly leaves any room for such behaviour to provide any
influence where possible.
My experience as a UDRP panelist, currently the only effective form of
"online arbitration," confirms the irrelevance of nonverbal behavior. Parties
have to follow the rules and never meet or interact with one another. The way
216 See KATSH & RIFKIN, supra note 14, at 147-50.
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the procedure has been designed prevents any humanization of the process.
In my opinion, interaction issues could only arise if online hearings were
taking place through the use of audiovisual means. Such a development,
however, remains remote for the time being, and the reader can be referred to
the explanations given above as to the usage of audiovisual means.
IV. CONCLUSION
ODR is in fashion. Numerous scholars have dealt, deal, and will go on
dealing with ODR in the future. While several types of ODR systems have
been created, and while more providers are available, the actual use of ODR
systems remains fairly low. Legal scholars keep pointing out the current
shortcomings of ODR systems and wonder how to market them more
appropriately. Two crucial issues deserve particular attention: the building of
trust and the funding problem. This paper focuses on the building of trust.
Trust involves several sub-components. Credibility obviously plays an
important role and certain providers try to develop seal programs in order to
enhance the confidence of ODR consumers. Transparency and the
communication of detailed information as to the different ODR providers is
another way to build trust. This paper focuses on a third aspect of trust: the
differences between face-to-face and computer-mediated communication
interactions. This focus helps in determining whether the transition from
face-to-face to screen-to-screen interactions has any influence upon the
behavior of the parties, and if so, in which ways?
As one could have expected, differences are numerous. The absence of
nonverbal cues has a negative impact upon the participants who tend to react
defensively, and to construct more stereotyped and exaggerated
representations of their partners based upon the few social cues they can get
through the medium. The dehumanization of the interactions leads to
uninhibited behaviors, which in turn can quickly lead to "flaming" in
presence of a conflict and, consequently, in impasse. The social information-
processing model (SIP) developed by Walther in the mid 1990s has
demonstrated that these shortcomings could be overcome over time or
through mutual disclosure before the ODR proceedings actually start. This
theory convincingly shows that "the effects of time [are] stronger than the
effects of medium in general."217 The technological improvements may also
quickly fill in the gap between F2F and CMC, as the experiment conducted
217 Walther & Burgoon, supra note 134, at 77.
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by Bente and his team, mentioned above, tend to demonstrate,2 18 and because
of more frequent use of video conferences among attorneys.
Existing experiments, however, leave certain issues unanswered. Future
experimentation should investigate the effects of variations in the design of
ODR systems upon the participants, and the role of culture. Further research
focusing on the neutral rather than the parties themselves would also be
desirable.
One can nevertheless already draw some conclusions based upon what
precedes. Considering the fact that "the emotional aspect of communication
is key in affecting behavior, not the rational-contractual aspect,"219 ODR
providers should be concerned about designing systems that allow as much
personalization as possible. They can provide a profile of each neutral,
maybe a picture of them as well as the parties, or enable the participants to
have a first phone discussion about the issues at stake. This might help to
build rapport and lead to positive expectations. Since in-group members
seem to reach better outcomes than out-group members, one may also
wonder whether ODR providers should identify different types of
communities on the internet and whether they should design their system for
each one of these close-knit communities.220 This movement could be
reflected in the adoption of specific standards. To attract consumers, systems
should be as easy to use as possible and allow feedback so as to improve
perceived deficiencies. CMC technologies that are easier to use will indeed
be more attractive for the individual. 221 To prevent lengthy negotiations,
ODR systems should also provide a time-limit or a limited number of
possible e-mail exchanges.
All in all, one can be confident that the gap between F2F and CMC
interactions will be filled in sooner or later. Technology has evolved and will
continue to evolve. Future generations may even wonder why their parents
ever wondered if CMC could be assimilated to F2F. Our children may indeed
fill in this gap on their own. 222 At a time when teenagers meet online and
declare their love or break up relations through messages, 223 there is no
218 See Bente et al., supra note 215, at 151.
219 Moore et al., supra note 146, at 40.
220 See Rice & Love, supra note 134, at 91-92.
221 Linda Klebe Trevino & Jane Webster, Flow in Computer-Mediated
Communication, 19 COMM. REs. 539, 546 (1992).
222 David A. Larson, Online Dispute Resolution: Do You Know Where Your
Children Are?, 19 NEGOT. J. 199, 199 (2003).
223 Id. at 202 (noting that 48% of the 12 through 17 year old teenagers say that
"using the Internet improves their relationships with existing friends;" 56% say that
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doubt that effective relational behaviors can be developed in a screen-to-
screen environment, and that trust and intimacy can be established online.
The future may tell us that our children will be more confident using CMC
than F2F, but this is another story, one that only they will be able to write.
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online "communication holds a key place in their lives; one fifth of this online group
asserts that instant messaging is the main way they deal with their friends").
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